Premise (1) requires only the plausible claim that some proposition is not actually entertained.
If one cavils by appealing to gods or an infinite future, we can simply restrict the E and K operators to humans and to the current epoch.
Premises (2) and (3) appear to be instances of core principles of the logics governing K and A: Ap → Ap and (K p → p). Perhaps one can deny that the English word 'actually' satisfies (2), but it is hard to deny that there is a technical term that works this way. Denying (3) appears to require allowing that there can be knowledge of false propositions (although more on this later). 1 Premises (4) and (5) are instances of plausible principles governing entertaining: knowledge requires entertaining, and entertaining a proposition requires entertaining its constituents. (If someone entertains r ↔ @r, they thereby entertain r and its constituent q, so Eq is true and r is false.) Someone might object by holding that knowledge is dispositional while entertaining is occurrent, or that entertaining is not a subpropositional notion. One can straightforwardly get around this by having E p mean "Someone entertains a proposition of which p is a proper or improper constituent", and K p mean "Someone occurrently knows p", or "Someone knows p while entertaining p". 1 One could also invoke a dispositional notion of entertaining, but this leaves open the objection that all propositions are dispositionally entertained.
The conclusion follows from the premises by classical logic and the weak modal logic K (in fact, by minimal logic and by the version of K on which theorems of minimal logic are necessary).
From (3)-(5), one can derive (K(r ↔ Ar) → ((r ↔ Ar)&¬r)). From (1) and (2), one can derive (K(r ↔ Ar) → Ar). From these two claims one can derive (K(r ↔ Ar) → (r&¬r)), from which the conclusion follows.
The original version of the conclusion is the negation of an instance of the key thesis that p ↔ Ap is knowable for all p. Even if we make the modifications above, the modified conclusion that r ↔ Ar is not occurrently knowable by humans is no less interesting, as the standard reasons for holding that p ↔ Ap is knowable a priori are also reasons for holding that p ↔ Ap is occurrently knowable by humans (at least when the proposition is entertainable by humans).
Given the strength of the premises (I think that there is no serious question about the modified versions of (1), (4), and (5), and many will find (2) and (3) hard to reject), the most straightforward thing to do is to accept the conclusion, and to reject the view that p ↔ Ap is always knowable a priori.
If one accepts the conclusion, other surprising consequences follow. As well as rejecting the common view that p ↔ Ap is always knowable a priori, one may also have to accept that knowability is not closed under logical entailment. It is plausible that ∀p(p ↔ Ap) is not just knowable but known, and r ↔ Ar is logically entailed by it. In addition, one may also have to 1 If one rejects the notion of propositional constituency, as a possible-worlds theorist might, one can still derive an interesting conclusion by understanding K p semi-quotationally as 'Someone knowledgeably asserts p by uttering the sentence 'p" and E p as 'Someone utters a sentence that contains 'p' as a proper or improper part'. In addition: all the argument needs is a true proposition r such that in any world in which r obtains, (r ↔ Ar) is not believed. On the possible-worlds account there will plausibly be many such propositions (at least given that Ar is the necessary proposition): for example, many propositions consisting of the actual world and one other world. 2 accept that provability does not entail knowability. p ↔ Ap is a theorem in many systems of 'actually'-involving logic. If so, then r ↔ Ar is provable, in the sense that there exists a proof of it, although it is not knowable: the proof cannot be used to gain knowledge of r ↔ Ar.
Given the surprising consequences, one may want to examine the options in more detail. The available options are tied to different available views of the semantics of 'actually' and of the way it behaves in epistemic and modal contexts.
What we might call the face-value view of 'actually' holds that there is a proposition expressed by 'Ap' such that 'KAp' and ' Ap' say that this proposition is known or necessary (and likewise for other 'A'-involving sentences). Given the face-value view, the conclusion (6) follows directly from the standard principles above (Ap → Ap, there can be no knowledge of false propositions) and the existence of a true proposition r such that r ↔ Ar cannot be entertained when r is true.
A particularly clear illustration is provided by the standard Russellian view, which combines the face-value view with the claims that 'p' expresses a Russellian proposition p and that 'Ap' expresses the Russellian proposition p(@) holding that p is true in the actual world-state @. 2 If r is the Russellian proposition ¬Eq, where q is a Russellian proposition that is not actually entertained, then it is easy to see that if the Russellian proposition r ↔ r(@) is entertained in a world, it is false in that world. So the proposition cannot be (occurrently) known, and given the face-value view, (6) follows.
The standard Russellian view allows a diagnosis of the surprising consequences above. If this view is correct, it is possible to use the sentence 'r ↔ Ar' to express knowledge. But if one did so, in a possible world w, the sentence would express a proposition r ↔ r(w) distinct from the proposition r ↔ r(@) that it actually expresses. One might say that the sentence is semantically fragile: the proposition it expresses depends on whether speakers attempt to justify the sentence. Semantic fragility can explain the unknowability of the proposition in question, as well as the failure of closure of knowability under logical entailment (if one followed though the 1 For example, in the natural deduction system S5A of Hazen (1978) . Of course such systems will not have an unrestricted principle of necessitation for provable sentences. The standard notion of provability applies to sentences, but we can extend it to propositions by saying that a proof of a proposition p in a system L is an abstract sequence of interpreted sentences such that the sequence is a proof in L (in virtue of the logical form of the sentences) of a sentence that expresses p.
2 It is not obvious just what it is to know a proposition about the actual world @ in another possible world. Williamson (1987) raises questions about this notion in responding to Edgington (1985) , who invokes the notion in addressing Fitch's paradox of knowability. Soames (2007) gives an account on which such knowledge involves a sort of complete descriptive specification of @.
entailment, the sentence would express a different proposition) and the gap between knowability and provability (if anyone were to use the proof of the sentence to gain knowledge, the sentence would express a different proposition).
There remains a sense in which the sentence 'r ↔ Ar' is knowable a priori. The sentence is clearly justifiable in a way that can yield a priori knowledge. But in cases of semantic fragility, sentential justifiability comes apart from propositional justifiability. 3 One might also distinguish two sorts of propositional justifiability, analogous to the two sorts of provability distinguished above. Just as in these cases there exists a proof of the proposition that cannot be used to prove the proposition, one might say that there exists an a priori justification of the proposition (perhaps deriving from the proof itself) that cannot be used to justify the proposition.
Semantic fragility is easy to overlook. A case study is provided by Soames (2007) , who endorses the standard Russellian view while holding that p ↔ Ap is always contingent a priori when p is contingent ("There is an instance of the contingent a priori for each contingent truth").
He also gives an argument that the Russellian proposition in question is always knowable a priori.
The demonstration above strongly suggests that Soames is incorrect. What has gone wrong?
Soames argues that even when one does not know the Russellian proposition p ↔ p(@), one can come to know it a priori by a process that involves demonstrating the actual world-state @ as "This very world-state". But if one does not actually undergo the process, one cannot demonstrate @ in this way. If one were to undergo the process one would demonstrate not @ but a different world-state w. One might thereby come to know the proposition p ↔ p(w) a priori, but one would not thereby come to know the proposition p ↔ p(@) a priori. So Soames' argument fails.
Assuming that this process is the only way to come to know such propositions a priori (when p is not itself knowable a priori), then the natural conclusion is that (for such p), the Russellian proposition p ↔ p(@) is knowable a priori iff it is known a priori. 4 Semantic fragility is not limited to a Russellian view of propositions. If one holds an objectinvolving Fregean view, on which the proposition expressed by a sentence is a Fregean proposition with the referents of simple expressions in the sentence as constituents, one will also be confronted 3 There are other cases of semantic fragility. For example, one might introduce 'Knum' as a name for the number of propositions one will ever know. Then sentences involving 'Knum' will be semantically fragile, and some of them will introduce an analogous gap between sentential and propositional justifiability (for example, 'Knum is the number of propositions that I will ever know', uttered by someone who never knows any propositions due to irrationality). 4 Likewise, for all w, p ↔ p(w) is knowable a priori iff it is known a priori at w. This applies even if p has different
truth-values at @ and at w, so a further consequence of Soames' view is that many false propositions are knowable a priori.
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with the issue of semantic fragility. 5 If this view is combined with the view that the actual worldstate is part of the extension of 'actually', then sentences such as p ↔ Ap will be semantically fragile, just as on the Russellian view. If this view is combined with a face-value semantics for 'actually', then it will yield consequences analogous to those of the standard Russellian view. 6 Of course, the fact that semantic fragility provides a diagnosis of the surprising consequences need not make those consequences easier to accept. So one might want to consider a view of propositions on which the sentences in question are not semantically fragile, so that 'r ↔ Ar'
expresses the same proposition in all worlds: for example, a view on which 'actually' is a primitive operator, or a view on which the sentences in question express their primary intensions. But to avoid the consequences, one will still be left with a difficult choice between denying (2) and denying (3), and given the standard principles mentioned above, one will still be left denying the face-value semantics. 7 I think the most tenable way to reject the conclusion (whether one accepts semantic fragility or not) is to reject (3), and to reject the principle (KAp → Ap). To avoid allowing that there can be knowledge of false propositions, one must also reject the face-value semantics: that is, one must deny that 'Ap' expresses a proposition such that 'KAp' and ' Ap' say that this proposition is known or necessary. It will be then be natural (although not compulsory) to hold (KAp → K p) and (KAp → p).
There are a few ways to implement such a view. One might give a quotational analysis, on which epistemic contexts involve relations to sentences ('Ap') rather than propositions. One might
give an ambiguity analysis, on which 'Ap' expresses one proposition in modal contexts (perhaps p(@)) and another in epistemic contexts (perhaps p). Perhaps most promisingly, one might give a scope analysis, on which Ap says something like 'In the world, p' (where relative to any world w 'the world' denotes w), and in which the description here takes wide scope over modal but not 6 All this applies to the object-involving Fregean view in Chalmers (forthcoming), on which sentences express enriched propositions: structured two-dimensional entities involving both primary intensions and extensions as constituents. Given that r ↔ Ar' expresses an enriched proposition with the actual world @ as a constituent and given face-value semantics for modal and epistemic contexts, (6) follows. The conclusion can be mitigated by developing notions of sentential and propositional apriority that come apart from a priori knowability of a proposition (Chalmers forthcoming, notes 24 and 25): for example, an enriched proposition is a priori when the associated structured primary intension is knowable a priori. 7 A view that rejects semantic fragility and holds that the sentence 'Ap ↔ p' is always true when uttered will almost certainly hold that Ap is true at a world iff p is true there. For such a view to preserve (2), it must deny the face-value semantics for 'actually' in modal contexts, perhaps instead embracing a version of the scope analysis below. 5 epistemic operators. 8 There are some remaining options. One could adopt a pluralist view on which there are different readings of 'actually' that work in different ways. Perhaps there is one reading on which (2) is false, one on which (3) is false, and one on which the conclusion is true, for example. 9 Or one might accept the conclusion while finding nearby claims that are false, explaining away the intuition that the conclusion is false. For example, as suggested earlier, one might isolate a sense in which the sentence 'r ↔ Ar' is knowable a priori even though the proposition it expresses is not. Or one might isolate a notion of propositional apriority on which the proposition expressed by the sentence is a priori-perhaps in that there exists a conclusive a priori justification for it-even though it cannot be known a priori.
In conclusion: If one accepts an orthodox semantics for 'actually', one must reject the orthodox view that p ↔ Ap is always knowable a priori. Likewise, if one accepts the orthodox view that p ↔ Ap is always knowable a priori, one must adopt an unorthodox semantics for 'actually'. 10 
